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Brexit	has	complicated	and	isolated	Germany’s	role	in
the	EU
There	is	only	one	priority	for	Germany	and	the	UK	right	now	and	that	is	dealing	with	COVID-19.	The	available
estimates	of	the	costs	of	shutdown	in	the	form	of	lost	value-added	show	that	the	coronavirus	epidemic	will	cause
costs	that	will	probably	exceed	everything	known	from	economic	crises	or	natural	disasters	in	both	countries	since
the	Second	World	War.	In	the	meantime,	Brexit	has	happened	and	while	some	may	fear	that	a	British	withdrawal
from	the	EU	could	turn	Germany	into	a	hegemon,	Brexit	actually	has	complicated	and	isolated	Germany’s	role	in
the	EU,	argues	John	Ryan	(LSE).
Brexit	has	increased	the	perception	of	German	dominance	and	with	it	added	pressure	to	form	coalitions	to
counterbalance	its	power,	especially	on	discussions	on	the	Eurozone.	Paradoxically,	therefore,	Germany	could
actually	become	weaker	–	that	is,	less	able	to	get	what	it	wants	–	in	an	EU	without	the	UK.	Meanwhile,	expectations
of	Germany	and	its	role	in	the	EU	would	probably	increase	further.
Analysing	the	Brexit	negotiations	from	a	game-theoretical	approach,	the	EU	negotiation	behaviour	has	been
perfectly	rational:	the	British	exit	from	the	Union	has	threatened	the	EU’s	very	existence	during	a	time	of	right-wing
and	left-wing	populism	arising	in	several	member	states.	Any	buckling	would	strengthen	second	movers	all	over
Europe,	demanding	a	similar	if	not	a	better	deal	for	their	own	country.	In	the	face	of	a	possible	dissolution,	the	EU
has	not	given	in	to	the	British	demands	–	even	if	that	means	unfavourable	economic	prospects.
It	has	become	clear	that	for	both	parties	Brexit	will	bear	an	economic	risk	that	can	be	quantified	contingent	on	the
final	post-Brexit	scenario.	The	economic	harm	differs	significantly	depending	on	the	final	institutional	setting,
eventually	revealed	by	the	trade	negotiations.
German	export	enterprises	have	already	experienced	significant	losses	in	trade	with	Great	Britain.	Exports	to	that
country	–	which	in	2015,	were	still	running	at	more	than	€89	billion,	ranking	third	among	customers	of	German
products	–	have	fallen	to	less	than	€79	billion	in	2019,	while	exports	to	the	other	EU	countries	increased.	In	2020,
the	United	Kingdom	ranks	fifth	among	Germany’s	customers.	A	Brexit,	without	a	consensual	agreement,	would	sink
German	economic	growth	by	0.6	per	cent	in	2021,	predicts	the	German	Institute	for	Economic	Research	(DIW).
That	would	have	grave	consequences:	the	German	Chambers	of	Industry	and	Commerce	(DIHK)	are	predicting
economic	growth	in	2020	to	be	only	0.7	per	cent.	These	assessments	were	made	before	the	full	negative	economic
implications	of	the	COVID-19	outbreak	and	will	have	to	be	revised	down.
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While	Brexit	has	already	significantly	damaged	the	overall	German	economy,	the	hopes	Germany’s	financial	sector
had	placed	in	it	have	hardly	been	fulfilled.	Back	in	2016	–	2017,	there	had	been	predictions	–	spurred	on	by	PR
organizations	in	Hesse’s	banking	sector	–	that	Brexit	would	lead	to	a	massive	migration	of	financial-sector	jobs	to
Frankfurt	am	Main.	According	to	a	study	published	in	the	summer	of	2017,	London	would	lose	10,000	finance-
sector	jobs	to	Frankfurt.	Since	finance-sector	employees	have	generated	a	strong	demand	in	other	sectors	in	the
Rhine-Main	region,	an	additional	36,000	(“cautious	scenario”),	perhaps	even	88,000	(“optimistic	scenario”)	jobs
were	expected	to	be	created	outside	the	financial	sector.	In	Frankfurt	alone,	the	additional	annual	tax	receipts	were
predicted	to	be	towards	€185	million.
A	current	inventory	paints	a	significantly	different	picture.	It	is	the	case	that	a	number	of	financial	institutions	have,
in	fact,	opened	offices	in	Frankfurt,	or	increased	their	personnel	–	often	because	within	the	EU,	financial
transactions	may	only	be	made	from	locations	within	the	EU.	However,	this	increase	has,	until	now,	been	limited	to
an	increase	of	only	1,500	financial	sector	jobs,	or	merely	one-sixth	of	the	original	prognosis.	Frankfurt’s	banking
sector’s	PR	agencies	are	still	optimistic	that,	by	the	end	of	2021,	another	2,000	jobs	will	be	added.	However,
according	to	Helaba	bank,	those	jobs	will	hardly	compensate	for	the	current	downsizing	taking	place	in	Germany’s
major	banks.	According	to	these	estimates,	Frankfurt	will	have	64,500	jobs	in	the	financial	sector	by	the	end	of
2021,	thanks	to	the	aspired	Brexit-induced	increase	–	a	mere	600	more	than	at	the	end	of	2018,	with	subsequently
saw	a	distinct	downward	trend.	This	compares	to	approximately	380,000	finance-sector	jobs	in	London.	Therefore,
while	the	economy,	as	a	whole,	is	taking	a	beating,	even	Germany’s	financial	sector’s	long-propagated	ray	of	hope
has	proven	to	be	a	deception.
With	Brexit,	the	centre	of	gravity	in	the	EU	has	now	shifted	southeast,	in	the	European	Parliament,	but	above	all	in
the	Council.	With	the	UK	as	a	member,	the	north	(defined	as	Germany,	Sweden,	Denmark,	Finland,	Ireland.	and
the	Netherlands)	had	a	blocking	minority	of	36.8%.	Without	the	UK,	that	share	has	dropped	to	27.8%,	too	small	for
a	veto.	Even	when	Austria	and	the	Baltics	are	included,	the	north	can	now	be	overruled.
So	far,	the	UK	has	made	it	clear	that	there	will	be	no	discussion	of	a	possible	extension	of	the	transition	period
beyond	the	end	of	2020.	The	few	officials	still	charged	with	enacting	the	government’s	Brexit	policy	have	been	told
by	key	figures	in	the	cabinet	that	nothing	has	changed	in	terms	of	the	post-transition	exit	date	of	31	December
2020.		If	this	changes	because	of	COVID-19	the	government	would	have	to	change	the	law.	This	is	because	the
government	legislated	in	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	Act	to	prevent	ministers	from	agreeing	to	an	extension	of	the
transition	period.	However,	this	could	be	overturned	by	a	very	short	bill,	assuming	Parliament	is	sitting,	and	the	bill
can	gain	a	majority.
On	the	other	hand,	the	COVID-19	crisis	will	cause	significant	damage	to	the	UK	and	EU	economies	which	may	well
make	a	fast	track	agreement	possible.	However,	this	view	may	be	over-optimistic	because	the	crisis	implications	on
their	economies	and	fatalities	may	continue	into	late	2020	unless	a	vaccine	is	available	which	at	the	moment	seems
unlikely.
A	no-deal	Brexit	is	an	unpredictable	outcome	that	poses	a	risk	to	global	financial	stability.	Regardless	of	how	EU
leaders	choose	to	answer	the	questions	posed	by	Brexit,	the	instability	and	uncertainty	will	not	end	anytime	soon.
Britain	became	the	first	country	ever	to	leave	the	28-nation	European	Union	and	Prime	Minister	Boris	Johnson
insists	that	negotiations	must	conclude	by	December	31,	2020.	Unless	a	trade	deal	is	agreed,	this	means	no-deal
Brexit	on	“most	favoured	nation”	terms	under	World	Trade	Organisation	rules.	These	are	the	same	rules	under
which	Britain	currently	operates	much	of	its	global	trade,	including	with	China,	Russia	and	the	United	States,	and	is,
therefore,	a	feasible	default	position.
While	this	would	leave	the	UK	free	to	pursue	a	domestic	and	international	agenda	without	hindrance	by	EU	rules,
the	immediate	disruption,	including	an	unavoidable	hard	border	between	Northern	Ireland	and	Ireland,	will	make	for
a	very	uncomfortable	position	economically	and	politically.
The	UK’s	departure	leaves	enormous	political	and	financial	gaps	in	the	EU.	Unfortunately,	Chancellor	Merkel’s	own
EU	policy	remains	somewhat	of	a	conundrum.	Although	there	is	now	significant	domestic	pressure	to	pursue	a
more	pro-European	course	of	action.
This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	and	not	the	position	of	LSE	Brexit,	nor	of	the	London	School	of
Economics.	Image:	Public	Domain.
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